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Given his view’s need of teleology, the independent plausibility of his 
view in its own right, and independent reasons for rejecting the causal 
closure principle, he sees no compelling reason to reject all teleological 
explanation. Indeed, he sees naturalism, not science, as the primary moti-
vator for rejecting purposeful explanation (here, he incorporates material 
from his co-authored book with Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Eerdmans, 
2008)). The purpose that his perfect happiness account requires (at both 
personal and cosmic levels) is threatened, not by science, but by a ques-
tionable naturalism, so he argues.
Finally, in chapter 5 he concludes by bringing his perfect happiness 
view of life’s meaning into conversation with important issues at the fore 
in discussions over the problem of evil and eschatology. Along the way 
he interacts with strategies enlisted by some theistic philosophers to neu-
tralize the problem of evil, most notably skeptical theism. He even devel-
ops his own theodicy, incorporating the idea of perfect happiness. This is 
surely a place where Goetz’s book gestures both directly and indirectly to 
the need for increased theoretical development—questions at the intersec-
tion of the meaning of life and the problem of evil in general, the meaning 
of life and skeptical theism in particular, and the connection between end-
ing, death, and life’s meaning.
The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective makes an important contribu-
tion to the growing discussion within analytic philosophy over life’s mean-
ing. Goetz covers a lot of interesting philosophical territory to make his 
case—value theory, naturalism, reductionism, the problem of evil, even 
heaven and hell. His choice of interlocutors is equally as interesting: St. 
Augustine, Bertrand Russell, C. S. Lewis, Daniel Dennett, Thomas Nagel 
and Alvin Plantinga to name a few. Those interested in a monograph-
length discussion of life’s meaning from a theistic perspective will want to 
read this book. I hope that Goetz’s contribution motivates others to work 
further (or for the first time) in this area.
Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature 
Is Almost Certainly False, by Thomas Nagel. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. x + 130 pages. $24.95 cloth.
WILLIAM JAWORSKI, Fordham University
Thomas Nagel argues in his most recent book that the materialist world-
view which has come to dominate academic philosophy and the non-
academic philosophizing of many scientists cannot provide an adequate 
explanation of life’s origins. As a result, Nagel proposes that we consider 
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seriously an alternative account—not the theistic one favored by intelli-
gent design theorists, but one inspired by Aristotle’s philosophy and its 
central notion of natural teleology. 
Teleological explanations attribute end-directedness to things. The most 
familiar teleological explanations are intentional ones, but non-intentional 
teleological explanations are common in biology. Plants, for instance, 
grow leaves in order to capture energy from the sun. Presumably things 
like plants do not form intentions, so their end-directedness must be due 
to something else. In the ancient world, Plato suggested it was due to an 
external intentional source, an intelligent being who assigned functions 
to natural things the way people assign functions to artifacts. Aristotle 
disagreed. Natural teleology was not derivative and external, but basic 
and internal. Some things simply have innate tendencies to grow, develop, 
and behave in end-directed ways. Aristotle’s understanding of teleology 
was shelved after the Scientific Revolution, but Plato’s found modern 
sympathizers in William Paley and contemporary intelligent design theo-
rists. Many people still consider it to be the only alternative to materialist 
accounts which either eliminate teleology or reduce it to something else. 
Nagel argues that these alternatives fail.
According to Nagel, materialist theories lack the resources to explain 
the emergence of life. The reason is that they lack the resources to explain 
the emergence of consciousness, reason, and value. Adequate explana-
tions must imply that the phenomena they explain are not mere chance 
occurrences but expected outcomes. Since consciousness, reason, and 
value are the most recent outcomes of the same process responsible for the 
emergence of basic biological phenomena, any adequate explanation of 
the latter must imply that consciousness, reason, and value were expected 
outcomes of the same process. Nagel claims that materialist theories are 
incapable of providing explanations of this sort; consequently, they fail to 
provide an adequate explanation for the basic emergence of life. We thus 
need an alternative. The one offered by theists is unacceptable both be-
cause it is incompatible with Nagel’s atheism and because by locating the 
intelligibility of the natural world in something outside that world, it fails 
to provide the kind of unified understanding that philosophy hopes to 
achieve. That leaves natural teleology: there is in the fabric of the cosmos 
a (non-intentional) predisposition to produce value, reason, conscious-
ness, and life. Such a predisposition provides the additional conceptual 
resources needed to understand the emergence of life and mind.
Mind and Cosmos is independent-minded, thought-provoking, and rela-
tively short. Nagel avoids technical jargon, although he tends to use terms 
like “materialism” in proprietary ways that can make it difficult to map 
his ideas onto familiar debates. I also have some reservations about his 
arguments.
First, we’ve seen that according to Nagel a successful explanation 
of life depends on a successful explanation of consciousness, reason, 
and value. At times I found the rationale for this premise difficult to 
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appreciate. Consider Nagel’s criticism of panprotopsychism. Panproto-
psychism claims that the basic elements of the universe have both physi-
cal and proto-mental properties. Nagel claims that in order to explain the 
emergence of life, panprotopsychists have to assign a central role to the 
proto-mental properties of the elements. But why can’t panprotopsychists 
endorse a two-stage explanation: physical properties explain the origins 
of basic biological processes, and proto-mental properties are powers that 
remain latent until basic biological processes first appear, at which point 
they become active and operate to bring about consciousness? By anal-
ogy, think of two-stage devices like a hydrogen bomb, which has fission 
and fusion stages. The detonation of a fissile core creates temperatures 
hot enough to trigger the detonation of a fusile core. Couldn’t the physi-
cal properties of the elements create conditions that subsequently trigger 
the activation of latent proto-mental properties? In that case, the account 
of life’s origins, the biological processes that at a bare minimum qualify 
something as living, would not have to appeal to proto-mental properties; 
those properties would have to be invoked only to explain how something 
that qualified as living also qualified as conscious.
Nagel does suggest a response. He argues that because mental proper-
ties and behavior are “internally connected” in the lives of macroscopic 
organisms, proto-mental properties and proto-behavioral physical prop-
erties would have to be internally connected in a similar way at the level 
of their microscopic parts. Proto-mental properties would thus have to 
have physical implications at the microscopic level just as full-blown men-
tal properties do at the macroscopic level. Yet even if there are internal 
connections between proto-mental and physical properties, as Nagel pro-
poses, it is still not evident why physical properties could not be sufficient 
by themselves to explain the basic emergence of life, for this hypothesis 
is compatible both with physical properties necessitating the activation of 
proto-mental properties and with physical properties being necessitated 
by them. It thus seems possible either that proto-mental properties could 
factor into an explanation of basic biological processes indirectly in the 
sense of explaining the physical conditions that were directly responsible 
for the emergence of those processes, or else that they could play no role 
in explaining the emergence of basic biological processes at all, as I sug-
gested above, but only a role in explaining consciousness. I am not sure 
Nagel says anything that rules out this kind of view, but in that case, it is no 
longer clear that a successful materialist explanation of life must depend 
on a successful materialist explanation of consciousness, as he insists.
Nagel’s argument that materialism cannot explain the emergence of 
reason faces a similar problem:
[S]uppose I observe a contradiction among my beliefs and “see” that I must 
give up at least one of them. . . . It is not adequate to say that . . . I feel the 
urgent need to alter my beliefs to escape [contradiction], which is explained 
by the fact that avoiding contradictions, like avoiding snakes and precipices, 
was fitness-enhancing for my ancestors. (82–83)
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An alternative picture of reason takes the ability to recognize and respond 
to contradictions to be the result of training and habituation. Not only 
would this explain why some people apparently feel no compulsion to re-
ject either of a pair of contradictory beliefs, it would also mesh with what 
most of us know about practical affairs; namely, people sometimes think 
and act in contradictory ways. If responsiveness to reasons is a learned 
behavior, then an explanation of it will not appeal directly to natural se-
lection as Nagel suggests; it will appeal instead to learning. In that case, 
however, it is possible to endorse a multi-stage explanation for rational 
capacities that separates the task of explaining reason’s emergence from 
the task of explaining life’s emergence. Natural selection explains our abil-
ity to learn, learning explains our ability to recognize and respond to rea-
sons, and both factors are separate from the physico-chemical occurrences 
that explain the basic emergence of life. Nagel says nothing to rule out an 
account of reason like this, so it is once again unclear why a successful 
materialist explanation of life depends on a successful materialist explana-
tion of mind.
Third, Nagel’s argument that materialism cannot explain the emer-
gence of value relies heavily on Sharon Street’s argument that moral real-
ism and natural selection are incompatible. The argument’s key premise 
is that a capacity to discern moral truth would contribute nothing to 
reproductive fitness beyond what a capacity merely to act as if there is 
moral truth would contribute. By analogy someone might argue that an 
organism does not actually have to perceive environmental threats to act 
in ways that contribute to its reproductive fitness; it is enough for it to act 
as if it perceives a threat since false positives may be as effective promot-
ing survival and reproduction as true positives. But there are surely limits 
to this reasoning. Something must explain how a capacity that generates 
false positives could manage to contribute to reproductive fitness, and in 
many cases the explanation will be that the same capacity also produces 
true positives. In the perceptual case, a disposition to act as if there are 
environmental threats contributes to reproductive fitness because some-
times there really are environmental threats. But then parity of reasoning 
suggests that a disposition to act as if there are moral truths contributes to 
reproductive fitness because sometimes there really are moral truths. To 
illustrate this point consider Nagel’s example of pain:
the real badness of pain and the ability to recognize that badness are com-
pletely superfluous in a Darwinian explanation of our aversion to pain. The 
aversion to pain enhances fitness solely in virtue of the fact that it leads us 
to avoid the injury associated with pain, not in virtue of the fact that pain is 
really bad. (108–109)
Suppose, however, that pain is not bad in itself, but that it is good for or-
ganisms like us to be capable of experiencing pain since pain enables us to 
avoid things that really are bad for us. A disposition to act as if something 
is harmful contributes to reproductive fitness because sometimes things 
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really are harmful. On this view, which Nagel doesn’t address, the real 
goodness of pain-capability and the real badness of harmful environmen-
tal factors are not completely superfluous to a Darwinian explanation of 
our aversion to pain.
Finally, even though Aristotle is Nagel’s touchstone for natural teleol-
ogy, the view of teleology Nagel favors has a residual Platonic element. 
Like Plato, Nagel sees teleology as a cosmic tendency; the universe is 
almost like a giant organism that tends to behave in ways that produce 
life and mind. I’m not sure a contemporary Aristotelian would or should 
agree. Aristotle claimed that teleology could be found everywhere in the 
natural world not because the universe as a whole had innate teleological 
tendencies, but because the things that exist in the universe acted indi-
vidually in end-directed ways. Organisms on the Aristotelian view are 
localized pockets of order and end-directedness within a cosmos that a 
contemporary Aristotelian needn’t take to have any overarching teleo-
logical tendencies of its own. Unlike Aristotle, we are convinced that the 
universe had a beginning, that living things did not always exist, and that 
what kinds of living things there are can change over time. But contempo-
rary Aristotelians can accommodate these ideas without turning the cos-
mos as a whole into something like a giant organism. This suggests a view 
that has a place for teleology, but that meshes with a Darwinian account 
of natural selection more easily than the cosmic teleology Nagel proposes.
